The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to vote on whether to adopt a resolution for new sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, which were conducted earlier this year.
It is a mercy that the international community is again striving to resolve the escalating geopolitical risks on the Korean peninsula. Council members are likely to support Seoul and its closest ally Washington, which are pressing Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear arms development.
Government officials stress that the sanctions this time will be stronger than ever, as the new resolution is going to subject cargo ships leaving and entering the North to mandatory inspections. They say that it would also would prohibit the sale of small arms and other conventional weapons to the North, closing a loophole in earlier resolutions.
But some observers raise the efficacy of the disciplinary measures, citing the past five U.N.-led sanctions on North Korea, which had become hazy as time went on, with no particular penalties being handed down on the countries that violated the rules on trade with the North.
Sanctions had been lifted in return for the North’s proposals to hold dialogue with the South and the United States. But attempts at reconciliation, including the six-party talks, used to break down after bearing little fruit, as the dictatorial regime declined to agree to the scheme to denuclearize the peninsula.
So it is not extraordinary that skepticism over this resolution is emerging again. Skeptics say there is little possibility of the Kim Jong-un regime scrapping its nuclear weapons development as long as China tolerates it.
A similar case can be seen in Pakistan, which has become one of the few nuclear powers amid China’s allegedly strategic alliance with the country to counterbalance India, which in turn is backed by the U.S. The difference from Pyongyang case is that Pakistan has built economic and diplomatic relations with both China and the U.S. thanks to its participation in the U.S.-led counterterrorism attacks.
China has appeared relatively passive in pressuring the North. According to U.S. Congress data, China has also provided the North with enormous low-key economic assistance as the wayward country’s dominant trading partner.
If Beijing regards Pyongyang as a sort of shield against Seoul, Washington and Tokyo as similar to its dealing with Pakistan versus India, the U.N.-led resolution would be of no use.
A noteworthy point is that the Kim regime is seemingly turning away from his processors’ blind worship of China. A recent case was seen from the regime’s sudden cancelation of the Pyongyang-based Moranbong band’s performance in Beijing.
Some signs of a policy shift are creating an assumption among some pundits that the North might benchmark the Pakistani model, which is aimed at dual relations with the G2 — China and the U.S. — on the back of its nuclear power.
The question is whether or not China can control North Korea the way it did in past decades.
