The Park Geun-hye government faces a deepening dilemma as calls grow for peace treaty talks with North Korea alongside denuclearization negotiations while Seoul has set about funneling all of its diplomatic energy into having Pyongyang desert nuclear weapons.
The decades-old move to officially end the 1950-53 Korean War was rekindled late last month when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested initiating denuclearization and peace treaty discussions in tandem during his visit to Washington.
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| U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (left) meets Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during their talks in Beijing on Jan. 27. (Yonhap) |
His dual-track approach appeared to be primarily designed to defuse tension on the peninsula and appease the Kim Jong-un regime, as China joined the U.N. Security Council in levying a fresh set of the strictest ever sanctions on its errant neighbor over its latest nuclear and missile tests.
Yet, controversy flared up after the U.S. State Department signaled its willingness to hold the two different talks simultaneously, although it placed greater emphasis on denuclearization.
As for South Korea, however, the two-pronged method is inconceivable at least for now, given its own shift of course in the wake of Pyongyang’s recent provocations which set sanctions and pressures as the main vehicle of its North Korea policy. Following Wang’s speech, Seoul reasserted its stance, declaring no peace treaty dialogue with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Though Washington sought to settle the fuss by reaffirming that denuclearization remains a top priority, concerns persist that should the U.S. and China manage to move forward with the idea, South Korea may be sidelined in both disarmament and peace treaty talks.
“Despite its later attempts to straighten things out, the State Department’s initial message seemed to be built on Wang’s meeting with (U.S. Secretary of State John) Kerry,” a senior Foreign Ministry official here said, asking for anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.
“Given the many other underlying issues in their regional and global strategies, the U.S. may eventually agree to set the parallel talks in motion, such as a bargaining chip in exchange for its planned stationing of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (missile) battery here, staunchly opposed by China. But when they do so, they would likely put us aside for the time being because they know about Seoul’s resistance but would have to minimize any sources of distraction.”
Another ministry official said: “There is clearly a change in China’s approach to peninsula issues, intended in part to deflect international criticism over its solid backing for the North despite the persistent provocations. For the time being, however, peace treaty talks would only get the already troubled denuclearization efforts sidetracked further.”
Forging a peace treaty has been a perennial source of contention between the stakeholders — the two Koreas technically remain at war in line with the 1953 armistice agreement.
Previous efforts have made little headway, including a working group on establishing a peace and security regime in Northeast Asia set up after the six-party denuclearization talks reached a watershed Sept. 19, 2005 joint statement.
Seoul’s Foreign Ministry soon installed a peace regime division under its Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs office but its core cause has long faded, currently focusing on unification diplomacy and Park’s initiative for creating a regional peace and cooperation scheme. The Unification Ministry here has also launched a related team, only to see it dismantled before long.
While Pyongyang shows no willingness to abandon its nuclear ambitions, Beijing has nonetheless been continuing to flesh out its overtures. At a news conference in Beijing last week, Wang displayed an “open attitude” toward previously shunned gatherings between three, four or even five members of the six-nation forum excluding the North.
The minister also pledged to come up with detailed action plans following a meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov last Friday. He called the two-track approach the “greatest common factor that is reasonable, objective and fair and could bring about an agreement between the six parties,” according to Beijing’s Foreign Ministry.
The gap with Seoul was also highlighted during South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s phone call late Monday with Wang. Mindful of his counterpart’s calls for a peace treaty dialogue, Yun stressed that it is time to “focus more on thoroughly implementing the UNSC sanctions,” citing Pyongyang’s ongoing threats of nuclear provocations in defiance of the international resolutions.
“I think it is very dangerous,” said Park Whee-rhak, dean of the Graduate School of Politics and Leadership at Kookmin University.
“This is not a treaty to guarantee peace. North Korea‘s intention is to be recognized as the sole government on the Korean Peninsula through continuous negotiations with the U.S. South Koreans should be well aware of the trap of the peace treaty.”
To tackle the dilemma, Seoul should rather turn the current situation into a chance to bring the spotlight back to and reinitiate denuclearization negotiations, said Koo Hae-woo, who formerly oversaw North Korean affairs at the National Intelligence Service and now is president of the Korea Institute for Future Strategies, a private think tank in Seoul.
“For our part, we should actively utilize the current situation where the U.S. and China float the denuclearization and peace treaty issues, and make it real,” he said at a seminar in Seoul on Tuesday.
“A moratorium on North Korea’s nuclear program, alongside the nonproliferation issue, should first and foremost be addressed, through negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, the two Koreas and the six party nations, followed by peace treaty dialogue for establishing a peace regime here.”
By Shin Hyon-hee (heeshin@heraldcorp.com)
